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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is investigate the effect of the Enterprise Risk Management   
implementation (ERM) on firm performance, mainly focusing on the bank industry.   
The population and the sample consist of 24 public listed banks, only 15 banks were 
selected to be the sample. The time period of the study was from 2011 to 2015, the 
data are taken from banks’ annual reports of fiscal year ends on December 31 of each 
year and the data set consists of 11 private banks and 4 government banks. In this 
study using panel data and using pooled ordinary least square (OLS) and random 
effect analysis. The results are surprised and controversial. We find a negative 
statistically significant effect between the ERM adaption and Tobin’s Q, while 
positive effect on Return On Equity of bank performance.  This study also shows that 
DGOVERNMENT and DERM play a significant factor in explaining the performance 
in Indonesia banks. 
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A. INTRODUCTION  
 Demidenko and McNutt (2010) stated that risk management is a means to realize 
the company's goals and monitor the performance of management. Risk management 
is implemented because it will generate more information about organizational risks 
and result in better management, and better decision making (Kleffner et al., 2003). 
 
Interest in Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) continues to grow in recent 
years. Increasing the number of bank that have implemented or are preparing for the 
ERM program, many consulting firms are established with specialization in 
Enterprise Risk Management and various academics have developed programs or 
training related to ERM (Hoyt & Liebenberg, 2011). 
 
The efforts to improve the quality of risk management can be done through 
integrated risk management that is ERM implementation. ERM enables management 
to effectively address the uncertainties associated with risks and opportunities, as well 
as enhance the capacity to build corporate value.  
 
ERM program has more benefits by providing more information about the 
company's risk profile. This is because outside factors are more likely to experience 
difficulties in assessing the financial and complex financial strengths and risks of a 
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company. The existence of ERM allows companies to provide this information 
accurately and accurately to outsiders about the risk profile and also serves as a signal 
of their commitment to risk management (Hoyt & Liebenberg, 2011). 
           
The main objective of risk management is to eliminate the possibility of low 
income earned by the organization, and can help organizations move on capital 
optimization and ownership structures (Stulz, 2003). By applying risk management to 
the company, especially in the field of banking industry will surely get more value in 
business activities. 
 
             Beasley et al. (2008) in his research found that the impact of new ERM 
implementation is felt in the long run, where the company has implemented ERM 
thoroughly in the internal environment of the company and communicated to all 
management lines. The application of risk management needs to be guarded by 
certain principles, so that it works well and effectively. Most of the risks faced by the 
company must be managed by the company concerned. This makes risk management 
a must for  company. 
 
Despite this increasing interest in risk management, academic research in this 
area is still scant. A reason is the difficulty in developing a reliable measure for the 
ERM construct. Some authors (Beasley et al.  2008; Hoyt & Liebenberg, 2011) use 
the appointment of a chief risk officer (CRO) as a proxy for ERM implementation. 
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Others (like Gordon et al. 2009) develop their own index. Moreover, the majority of 
the empirical studies concerns the financial industry, in particular the insurance one 
(Bertinetti et al. 2013).  Results found so far are as follows: the implementation of 
ERM benefits firms by decreasing earnings and stock price volatility, increasing 
capital efficiency, and creating synergies between different risk management 
activities (Miccolis and Shah, 2000; Cumming & Hirtle, 2001; Lam, 2001; 
Meulbroek, 2002; Beasley et al. 2008). Furthermore, ERM adoption seems to 
promote increased risk awareness, which facilitates better operational and strategic 
decision-making. 
 
This purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of ERM implementation, and 
to establish whether firms adopting ERM actually achieve observable results 
consistent with the claimed benefits of ERM. We believe that our work is important 
and timely because although many surveys have stated the benefits of adopting ERM 
(Marsh and McLennan, 2005), there has been little empirical evidence on how ERM 
affects bank performance. We argue that the primary goal of ERM is to reduce the 
probability of financial distress and allow firms to continue their investment 
strategies by reducing the effect lower tail outcomes, whether earnings or cash flow, 
caused by unexpected events (Pagach and Warr, 2007). Having smoother, steadier 
earnings and cash flow performance allows the firm to increase leverage, pursue more 
growth options and perhaps be more profitable.  
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B. LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
ERM's main goal is to maintain and enhance the value of the company. The 
traditional approach to risk management suggests both to implement hedging 
activities (mainly financial derivatives), and to buy corporate insurance. Many studies 
investigate the link between TRM and firm value, with controversial results. 
Allayannis and Weston (2001), Graham and Rogers (2002), Nelson et al. (2005), 
Carters et al. (2006), Pagach and  Warr (2010), Bertinetti et al. (2013) show a positive 
relation between risk management  and firm value. However, Guay and Kothari 
(2003) and Jin and Jorion (2006) discover that derivative positions of most non-
financial companies are too small to significantly affect firm value. However Cyntia 
and Nanik (2015) and Izah and Ahmad (2011)) which found that the ownership 
structure of bank has no influence on Tobin’s Q. ERM have higher corporate value 
than companies that do not implement ERM. 
Another stream of research shows that risk management through hedging 
mitigates incentive conflicts, reduces expected taxes, and improves the firm’s ability 
to take advantage of attractive investment opportunities (Smith & Stulz, 1985; 
MacMinn, 1987; Campell & Kracaw, 1990; Nance et al. 1993), thus increasing their 
value. As far as the demand for corporate insurance is concerned, the literature shows 
that if considered as part of the company’s financing policy, corporate insurance may 
create new value through its effect on investment policy, contracting costs, and the 
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company’s tax liabilities (Mayers and Smith, 1982). The empirical evidence around 
these theoretical predictions is mixed: Mayers and Smith (1990), Ashby and Diacon 
(1998), Hoyt and Khang (2000), and Cole and McCullough (2006) support this view; 
instead, Regan and Hur (2007). 
As suggested by Pagach and Warr (2007), ERM creates firm value if it will 
reduce negative net cash flows and firms will not suffer losses while selecting a 
single project. Studies from Hoyt and Liebenberg (2006, 2008) found that ERM was 
positive and significant at 1 percent level. The empirical results support that 
Enterprise Risk Management would increase firm‟s value by 3.6% (Hoyt and 
Liebenberg, 2006) and 17% (Hoyt and Liebenberg, 2008). The study suggests that, if 
the company practices Enterprise Risk Management, the value of the company is 3.6 
percent (to 17 percent) higher than company which do not practice Enterprise Risk 
Management. Therefore, it is argued that Enterprise Risk Management is one of the 
factors that can add value to a firm. 
Pagach and Warr (2010) we find little impact from ERM adoption on a wide 
range of firm variables. While our results could be due to lower power tests, they also 
raise the question of whether ERM is achieving its stated goals. Overall, our results 
fail to find support for the proposition that ERM is value creating, although further 
study is called for, in particular the study of how ERM success can be measured. Izah 
and Ahmad (2011) Empirical results report that ERM is positively related to firm 
value but it is not significant. The results do not support the hypothesis that firms 
which practice ERM would have a higher Tobin’s Q ratio than firms which are not. 
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Several studies have documented that the government bank has a lower asset, 
higher cost and lower asset quality rather than private banks (Berger et al., 2004; 
Berger et al., 2005; and Micco et al., 2004). Additionally, Cornett et al. (2010) stated 
that the government bank has a lower income, small capital and high-risk loans. La 
Porta et al. (2002) showed that the bank are controlled by local or domestic 
ownership typically have a large share in non financial companies and tend to lend 
money to the companies associated whit them even if the loan is not competent (high 
risk).   
Fu and Heffernan (2009) examined the bank in China for the years 1985-
2002. The results showed that the private bank is more profitable than the 
government bank because the private bank has an income growth and higher 
efficiency rather than government bank, despite the private bank have smaller market 
share than government bank. Iannotta et al. (2007) examined three forms of bank 
ownership are private banks, joint venture banks and government banks within a 
sample of 181 banks in 15 European countries over the years 1999-2004. Bank 
performance is measured by gross profit. The results showed that government banks 
have smaller income rather than private banks because the government banks have 
lack of capital, less of deposits and less of lending, so that, the government bank 
cannot work optimally.  
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C. DATA AND METHODS 
 
This research employs the data from financial statements which consist of 24 
go public commercial banks operated in the Indonesia. The time period of the study 
was from 2011 to 2015, the data are taken from banks’ annual reports of fiscal year 
ends on December 31 of each year and the data set consists of 11 private banks and 4 
government banks. In this study using panel data and using pooled ordinary least 
square (OLS) and random effect analysis. While fixed effect did not used in the 
analysis because the number of banks has not changed during the period study and 
there were three dummy variables. The following model is estimated: 
Performanceit = α + β1 DERMit + β2 DGOVERNMENTit + β3 DERit  + eit  
 
Where i refers to the bank, t refers to the years 
Performanceit : Bank performance is measured by Tobin’s Q and Return 
On Equity of bank (ROE) 
DERMit : Dummy variable taking the value 1 for community 
development bank and 0 for otherwise bank. 
DGOVERNMENTit : Dummy variable taking the value 1 for government bank 
and 0 for otherwise bank. 
DERit: : Book value of total liabilities to market value of equity 
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D.  RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
Table 1. The Result Regression analysis 
Dependent Variable: Tobin’s Q  
Variable OLS without 
standard errors 
OLSwith robust 
standard errors                 
Random  Effect 
Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
Constan 28.8396   0.000***     28.8396   0.000***     28.8639   0.000***     
DERM -7.7738    0.075*     -7.7738    0.152       -7.7729   0.399     
DGOVERMENT 3.4819    0.345     3.4819    0.252     3.4863    0.656     
DER -1.1995   0.370     -1.1995   0.033**    -1.2210   0.132     
R-squared 0.0557   0.0557  0.0630 
AdjustedR-squared 0.0158   -  - 
Prob > F  0.2513   0.0801  - 
Numberobservation 75   75  75 
*, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively, p-value 
in parentheses 
 
DERM negative influence on Tobin's Q but positive influence on ROE. 
DERM has a negative effect on Tobin's Q due to the cost of the bank for ERM 
implementation is large enough to cause a negative response to shareholders. While 
ERM has a positive effect on ROE indicates that ERM is performing better because 
customers trust to save in bank.  although Impact of ERM implementation can only 
be felt for long period of time, where the bank has implemented ERM as a whole in 
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internal environment of company and communicated to all line of management. This 
result different with Allayannis and Weston (2001), Graham and Rogers (2002), 
Nelson et al. (2005), Carters et al., Rogers, and Simkins (2006), Pagach and  Warr 
(2010), Bertinetti et al. (2013) which found that the enterprise risk management has 
positive influence on Tobin's Q.. 
 
Table 2. The Result Regression analysis 
Dependent Variable: ROE 
Variable OLS without 
standard errors 
OLSwith robust 
standard errors                 
Random 
Effect 
Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
Constan 6.5812    0.006***     6.5812    0.084*     6.8846    0.124 
DERM 7.2237    0.006***     7.2237    0.058*     7.2343    0.173 
DGOVERNMENT 4.7119    0.032**     4.7119    0.004***      4.7670    0.290     
DER -1.0489   0.185     -1.0489   0.049**     -1.3171    0.008***    
R-squared 0.2259   0.2259  0.2659 
AdjustedR-squared 0.1932      
Prob > F  0.0004   0.0004   
Numberobservation 75   75  75 
*, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively, p-value 
in parentheses 
 
DGOVERNMENT positive influence on ROE. The profitability of a 
government-owned bank is due to two factors. First, the government assures you will 
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help its bank if there is a problem like bad debts. Secondly, the government bank 
serves as a government fundraiser (state revenue and expenditure estimates or State 
Budget), where the funds can be used by government banks to reduce the risk and 
increase the loan amount. Results of the study consistent of Reaz (2005), Beck et al. 
(2005), Berger et al. (2005), Omran (2007), Micco et al. (2007), Iannotta et al. 
(2007), Fu and Heffernan (2008), Yu and Neus (2009) and Flamini et al. (2009). This 
result different with  Hadad et al. (2003), Fernandez et al. (2005) and Chantapong 
(2005) which found that the ownership structure of bank has no influence on bank 
performance. 
 
  DER negative influence on Tobin's Q and ROE. This is indicated by 
decreasing leverage level will increase the value of the company and will attract 
investors to invest in the company. However, if the greater leverage leads to the 
greater likelihood that the company is experiencing financial distress and also the 
increased financial risks faced in fulfilling its obligation to pay interest and loan 
principal, it will have an impact on the declining value of the company. This results 
in less investor confidence in the company, so investors are less interested in 
investing in high levels of leverage and vice versa. 
 
 These results are consistent with those of Bertinetti et al. (2013), and Hoyt 
and Liebenberg (2008, 2011) found a negative relationship between leverage and firm 
value. Where illustrates that based on DER signal theory is expected to give a 
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negative signal to the investors, so the higher the value of the company. This is also 
due to the information asymmetry between the company and the investor and the 
decrease in DER affects the value of the company, this is because the debt made by 
the company's management is used to improve the bank's operations. 
 
E. CONCLUSION 
 
This purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of ERM implementation, and to 
establish whether firms adopting ERM actually achieve observable results consistent 
with the claimed benefits of ERM..  The results are surprised and controversial. We 
find a negative statistically significant effect between the ERM adaption and Tobin’s 
Q, while positive effect on Return On Equity of bank performance.  DERM has a 
negative effect on Tobin's Q due to the cost of the bank for ERM implementation is 
large enough to cause a negative response to shareholders. While ERM has a positive 
effect on ROE indicates that ERM is performing better because customers trust to 
save in bank.  This study also shows that DGOVERNMENT and DERM play a 
significant factor in explaining the performance in Indonesia banks. 
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